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EMROCH LECTURE
The Emroch Lecture Series was established through the gener-
osity of the late Mr. Emmanuel Emroch, his wife Bertha, and
their many friends and associates. The endowment is currently
supported by Mr. Emroch's son and daughter-in-law, Mr. &
Mrs. Walter Emroch. Mr. Emroch received a B.A. degree from
the University of Richmond in 1928 and a J.D. degree from the
University of Richmond School of Law in 1931. The Honorable
Susan Webber Wright presented this address as the Thirteenth
Annual Emroch Lecture on November 12, 1998, at the Universi-
ty of Richmond School of Law.
UNCERTAINTIES IN THE LAW OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
The Honorable Susan Webber Wright*
I. INTRODUCTION
The topic, "Uncertainties in the Law of Sexual Harassment,"
derived from my need to come up with a title for this talk
before I had really decided what I would say. Of course, I be-
lieve that I was invited here to talk about sexual harassment
because of the famous case, Jones v. Clinton,' that was before
me and might be remanded, and about which I am ethically
bound to remain silent.
* Chief Judge, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. B.A.,
1970, Randolph-Macon Woman's College; J.D., 1975, University of Arkansas; M.P.A.,
1978, University of Arkansas.
1. 990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
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Nevertheless, the topic itself is of current interest for other
reasons, including the 1998 decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,2 and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.' These companion cases de-
fined standards for employer liability when supervisors sexually
harass employees. Also this year, the Court decided Gebser v.
Lago Vista Independent School District,4 which defined stan-
dards for school district liability when teachers sexually harass
students. Because Jones v. Clinton does not involve any issues
of vicarious liability, and because this issue is an extremely
important one in the real world of employment, I have chosen
to concentrate my remarks on vicarious liability issues.
Unlike law professors who speak and write on policy, I do
not intend in this presentation to draw any significant policy
conclusions about the state of the law. In other words, I am not
intending to suggest what the law should be. Instead, my goal
is to present some issues that are yet to be resolved and, thus,
present uncertainties. Some of these uncertainties are legal, but
most are purely practical. This is not intended as another schol-
arly tome from the feminist perspective or a contribution to a
colloquy among law professors. Instead, it is a snapshot-in-time
from the perspective of one whose experience with the topic has
frankly been limited to only a few cases.
I hope to show that the Ellerth and Faragher decisions leave
uncertainties concerning the new affirmative defense now avail-
able to employers. I will mention some possible job-site ramifi-
cations of this new standard, including the possible impact
upon employee privacy. In addition, I briefly explore whether
these decisions will have any impact upon other types of ha-
rassment cases filed under Title VII.
Next, I will describe the standards set forth in Gebser for the
liability of a school district for a teacher's sexual harassment of
a student. In Gebser, a majority of the Supreme Court ruled
that the district would be liable only if an official with authori-
2. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
3. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
4. 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).
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ty to take corrective action had actual knowledge of the harass-
ment.5 This decision presents an interesting and perhaps con-
fusing contrast to the rules set forth in Ellerth and Faragher,
decided only one week later.
Another area of uncertainty that I will briefly describe was
created by Congress when it amended the Federal Rules of
Evidence in 1994. This action raises questions concerning em-
ployer liability because the new rules directly address admissi-
bility of prior sexual activity on the part of both the alleged
victim and the alleged perpetrator. These controversial rules
add uncertainty to issues of employer liability.
I conclude that the legal uncertainties will not be resolved
until either Congress or the Supreme Court, or both, firmly
grasp and clearly enunciate the goals of anti-harassment law.
IL BACKGROUND: CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 AND TITLE IX TO
THE EDUCATION AMENDMENTS OF 1972
The development of the law of sexual harassment began with
the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6 In
pertinent part, Title VII provides that it is "an unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against
any individual ... with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."7 Any-
one reading the brief legislative history of this law would hard-
ly conclude that it would encompass the principles of sexual
harassment law as it exists today.
The amendment adding sex to the list of protected categories
was offered by a congressman from Virginia who joked that
females outnumbered males in this country and read a letter
from a constituent who complained that this population imbal-
ance created spinsters who were deprived of a "right" to a hus-
band and family.8 The debate on the House floor indicated that
5. See id. at 1993.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
7. Id. at § 2000e-2(a)(1).
8. See 110 CoNG. REC. 2577 (1964) (letter to Rep. Smith of Virginia).
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some representatives voted for it because they believed that
without the amendment adding sex as a protected category,
white women would suffer an employment disadvantage to
black employees, including black women.9 In fact, it is widely
believed that sex was added by those in Congress who actually
opposed the legislation and guessed that if sex was included,
Congress would defeat the entire anti-discrimination mea-
sure.
10
In 1986, in Meritor Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson," the
United States Supreme Court acknowledged for the first time
that sexual harassment is discrimination on the basis of sex.'
In the 1992 decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools, 3 the Supreme Court recognized that sexual harass-
ment of a student by a teacher violates Title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972."4 Title IX prohibits discrimination
in educational programs in schools that receive federal financial
assistance. 5 The Supreme Court looked to Title VII to define
sexual harassment. Neither Meritor nor Franklin, however,
decided the issues of vicarious liability that confronted the
United States Supreme Court this past term.
III. UNCERTAINTIES FOLLOWING ELLERTH AND FARAGHER
Ellerth and Faragher represent an attempt by the Supreme
Court to settle the issue of employer liability for an actionable
sexually hostile environment in the absence of a "tangible em-
ployment" decision. 6 Because of Jones v. Clinton, I will not
9. See id. at 2583 (remarks of Rep. Andrews of Alabama); id. at 2584 (remarks
of Rep. Gathings of Arkansas).
10. See SUsAN M. OMILIAN & JEAN P. KAMP, SEX-BASED EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI-
NATION § 1.01, at 3. During the debate, Representative Edith Green of Oregon noted
that many of "those gentlemen of the House who are most strong in their support of
women's rights this afternoon probably gave us the most opposition when we consid-
ered a bill which would grant equal pay for equal work just a very few months ago."
110 CONG. REC. 2581 (1964).
11. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
12. See id. at 66-67.
13. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
14. See id. at 76.
15. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
16. The plain language of Title VII prohibits employers from making "economic"
or "tangible" employment decisions on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or nation-
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say anything substantive about what constitutes an actionable
hostile environment, but I note that the Supreme Court dealt
with the issue in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc." It will be
sufficient for this discussion to say that the Supreme Court as-
sumed that both Ms. Ellerth and Ms. Faragher were victims of
an actionable hostile environment. 8
In Ellerth, the plaintiff, Kimberly Ellerth, alleged that she
suffered sexual harassment from a supervisor (not her immedi-
ate supervisor), mostly in the form of suggestive comments. She
never reported the harassment to Burlington, her employer,
even though Burlington had an anti-harassment policy and a
complaint procedure for reporting incidents of harassment.
Despite the supervisor's statements, including that he could
"make her life very hard or very easy" at work, she was pro-
moted and suffered no job detriment or retaliation. 9 She quit
her job, stating reasons other than the harassment but later
wrote the employer complaining about the harassment. The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, en banc, reversed the district
court's summary judgment for the defendant employer, but did
so in eight separate opinions that reflect the lack of judicial
consensus in this area.20
In Faragher, the plaintiff, Beth Ann Faragher, worked for the
defendant Boca Raton as a lifeguard. She was the victim of
sexual harassment by two male supervisors who made lewd
remarks and offensively touched her and other female employ-
ees. Faragher, like Ellerth, suffered no tangible job detriment.
Even though the city had an anti-harassment policy, the policy
was not posted or otherwise published at the work site. The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the city could not
be liable for the supervisors' harassment and reversed the dis-
al origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1997). However, the Supreme
Court extended Title VII liability to "environmental claims" for sexual harassment so
"severe or pervasive" that they create "an abusive working environment." Faragher v.
City of Boca-Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2293 (1998) (citations omitted).
17. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
18. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2265 (1998); Faragher,
118 S. Ct. at 2293.
19. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2262.
20. See generally Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997)
(en banc).
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trict court's judgment awarding the plaintiff nominal damages
against the city.21
These twin appellate decisions epitomized the divergent ap-
proaches used by courts of appeals in determining employer
liability, and the United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari for both. The Court decided both cases the same day and
set 'forth standards designed to clarify employer liability in
sexual harassment cases. For those who are not familiar with
the decisions, a little background would be helpful to under-
stand the traditional rules governing employer liability for
wrongful acts of employees.
As required by the decision in Meritor,22 courts rely upon
common law rules of agency, outlined in the Restatement of
Agency, to determine the extent of employer liability for a
supervisor's sexually harassing conduct. Keep in mind that
agency law recognizes direct liability and indirect liability. Di-
rect liability applies for the employer's own fault, while indirect
liability results from the wrongful conduct of an employee.
Agency law imposes direct liability when the employer in-
tended the harassing conduct, when the employer was negligent
or reckless, or when the perpetrator is such a high-ranking
officer of the employer that the perpetrator is deemed to be the
"alter ego" of the employer.' Indirect liability for an
employee's harassment follows when the employee was aided in
his wrongful act by the existence of the agency relationship.2'
The Restatement of Agency also recognizes that an employer
shoulders liability for the wrongful act of an employee when the
employee acted "at least in part" to serve the employer.' An
example given in Ellerth portrays a salesperson who lies in
21. See Faragher, 111 F.3d at 1530 (11th Cir. 1998).
22. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
23. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2267; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2284. For a discus-
sion of a master's (employer's) direct liability, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY,
§ 219(a)-(b) (1957).
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (containing another clause
on liability resulting from apparent authority); see id. § 219(2)(c) (providing another
basis for liability-non-delegable duty). The Court in Ellerth discusses these sections
at some length. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2265-68.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(1)(c). See also Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at
2266; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2286 (applying § 228(1)(c)).
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making a sale. Such an act, even if prohibited by the employer,
benefits the employer and is therefore within the scope of em-
ployment.26 Another basis of employer liability is to impute an
employee's knowledge of wrongful conduct to the employer,
which is appropriate if the employee's duties would include
reporting misconduct.
In discrimination cases, courts have uniformly found an em-
ployer liable when the supervisor's discriminatory actions result
in a "tangible employment action," which "in most cases inflicts
direct economic harm."27 A typical situation is one in which
the supervisor conditions promotion or salary raises upon the
employee's yielding to the supervisor's sexual advances. This is
traditional "quid pro quo" harassment, as the supervisor with-
holds a job benefit or inflicts a job-related harm because the
employee rejected the supervisor's unwelcome sexual advances.
According to the majority opinion in Ellerth, "[a] tangible em-
ployment action constitutes a significant change in employment
status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment
with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing
a significant change in benefits."28 Because the tangible em-
ployment action is ultimately an employer action, the employer
liability flows from the agency relationship between the supervi-
sor and the employer.
In Ellerth and Faragher, proper application of these rules
would absolve both Ellerth's and Faragher's employers of any
liability--direct or indirect-for the supervisors' harassment.
The employers did not intend the conduct and were not negli-
gent or reckless. They were not liable on the basis that the
supervisors were aided by the agency relationship, as the Su-
preme Court has ruled that this liability "requires the existence
of something more than the employment relationship itself.""
Neither employer would be liable under a theory that it bene-
fited from the supervisors' wrongful conduct. As pointed out in
26. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2266.
27. Id. at 2269.
28. Id. at 2268.
29. See id. at 2269; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2285 (discussing the various reasons
courts have enunciated as the basis for finding employer liability for harassment
resulting in tangible employment action, or quid pro quo harassment).
30. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2268.
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Ellerth, the supervisor was not acting in any way to serve the
employer but was instead acting "out of gender-based animus or
a desire to fulfill sexual urges."3 ' The Faragher decision, on its
facts, rejected imputed knowledge as a basis for liability. Per-
haps most important, in neither case was there a "tangible
employment action" which would render the employer liable.32
Of course, no one can read the minds of Supreme Court Jus-
tices. But it is rather clear that a majority of the Justices be-
lieved that the intent of Title VII would be frustrated by limit-
ing employer liability to common law rules of agency and found
that "Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of anti-
harassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms."33
The Court established a new standard for employer liability
for sexual harassment if there is "an actionable hostile environ-
ment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively
higher) authority over the employee."34 In this situation, the
employer will be liable, but there is available an affirmative
defense which is unavailable in cases involving a tangible em-
ployment action;35 and the affirmative defense is focused on
avoiding harm (i.e., preventing and correcting harassment)."
The affirmative defense, well known today among lawyers
and employers alike, consists of two elements:
(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent
and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and
(b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.
31. Id. at 2266. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the supervisors
who harassed the plaintiff were acting for their own personal ends and were not
aided in their actions by the employment relationship. See Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 111 F.3d 1530, 1536-37 (11th Cir. 1997).
32. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2294.
33. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. "Title VII borrows from tort law the avoidable consequences doctrine." Id. at
2270 (citation omitted).
37. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293.
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This new standard, I suggest, opens up a number of issues,
including the requirement of reasonableness on the part of both
the employer and the alleged victim, the possible impact upon
employee privacy, and the effect upon legal standards for other
types of harassment proscribed by Title VII.
A. Reasonableness
It does not take a lawyer or a law student to imagine that
there are innumerable situations that will give rise to the fol-
lowing questions of fact: what constitutes "reasonable care" by
the employer to prevent and correct sexual harassment by su-
pervisors? And, what is "unreasonable failure" by the employee
to take advantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities
that the employer has taken reasonable care to provide? The
Court does not give us much help. We know, however, that in
Faragher, the city of Boca Raton lost because it did not publi-
cize its anti-harassment policy at the plaintiffs workplace, and
the policy did not include a complaint procedure that ensured
that the harassing supervisors would be bypassed. 8
Reasonableness is ordinarily a jury question, and therefore it
is possible that courts will be granting motions for summary
judgment less often in cases in which the employer is asserting
the Ellerth and Faragher affirmative defense. One judge has
written: "If Faragher and Ellerth signal anything, it is that
fewer sexual harassment cases will be resolved on summary
judgment."39
B. Employee Privacy
Justice Thomas, in his dissent in Ellerth, reasons that
"[s]exual harassment is simply not something that employers
can wholly prevent without taking extraordinary mea-
sures-constant video and audio surveillance, for example-that
38. See id.
39. Lissau v. Southern Food Service, Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 184 (4th Cir. 1998) (Mi-
chael, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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would revolutionize the workplace in a manner incompatible
with a free society."" Will employers, in their efforts to exer-
cise "reasonable care" in preventing and correcting sexual ha-
rassment, invade the privacy of workers? Will they inflict harm
on a "right to privacy" as they protect a right to be free from
sexual harassment? The answers to these questions are uncer-
tain.
Sexually, harassing e-mail, dubbed "e-harassment" by one
court,4' has provided many litigants with the evidence they
need to establish the existence of a sexually-hostile work envi-
ronment." In a 1996 case, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied a defen-
dant/employer's motion for summary judgment, in part because
of evidence of offensive e-mail." Even though the employer
took remedial action and withdrew e-mail privileges from of-
fending employees and had a grievance procedure in place, the
court found that whether the employer took "prompt" and "ef-
fective" remedial action remained a "reasonable ground for dis-
pute."45
Given the powerful evidentiary value of "e-harassment," it
comes as no surprise that a recent survey reported that two-
thirds of employers monitor their employees, including storing
and reviewing e-mail.46 Furthermore, one quarter of employers
who responded that they monitor employees confessed that they
do so surreptitiously.
40. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2273 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
41. See Rudas v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., No. 96-5987, 1997 WL 11302, at *1
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 1997).
42. In 1995, a group of Chevron employees filed a sexual harassment suit, alleg-
ing that Chevron allowed employees to transmit sexually harassing messages over the
company's e-mail system. See Marc Peyser & Steve Rhodes, When E-mail is Oops-
mail, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16, 1995, at 82. One of the offending e-mails presented a list
of "25 reasons beer is better than women." Id. Chevron settled for $2.2 million. See
id.
43. Harley v. McCoach, 928 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
44. See id. at 537.
45. Id. at 537, 540.
46. See Maggie Jackson, Boss Probably Spies on You, Survey Shows, LOS ANGELES
DAILY NEWS, May 26, 1997, at BI (discussing a 1997 American Management Asso-
ciation survey).
47. See id. Because most employees work at the will of their employers and most
courts review invasion of privacy claims under the "reasonable person" standard,
employees usually leave their right to privacy at home when they leave for work in
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Some employers go beyond monitoring in the workplace and
prohibit co-worker fraternization outside of work.48 While anti-
fraternization policies may offend our ideals of freedom and
privacy, they are legally valid under the employment-at-will
doctrine that governs most employment relationships.49 Even
before the Court's decisions in Faragher and Ellerth, workplace
privacy had become one of the leading labor issues of this de-
cade0 and with the steady growth of Title VII lawsuits,5 the
issue will likely intensify in years to come.
C. Title VII Standards for Other Types of Harassment
In Title VII, sex is listed along with race, color, religion, and
national origin as a protected class.52 There is nothing in the
language of the statute to suggest that sex discrimination mer-
its legal treatment distinct from other types of discrimination.
Justice Thomas, in his dissent in Ellerth, reasons that the stan-
dard for employer liability for a sexually hostile environment
should be the same as for a racially hostile environment: "An
employer should be liable if, and only if, the plaintiff proves
that the employer was negligent in permitting the supervisor's
conduct to occur."53 Since this new affirmative defense exists
for sexual harassment cases, perhaps it will apply as well to
other types of harassment under Title VII.
Courts have, on occasion, followed racial harassment deci-
sions as precedent in sexual harassment cases.54 Surely no
the morning. See Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding
that when Pillsbury told its employee that his e-mail would remain private, the em-
ployee still had no reasonable expectation of privacy).
48. See, e.g., Watkins v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 1349 (S.D. Miss.
1992).
49. See id. at 1359.
50. See PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 351
(1996); David F. Linowes & Ray C. Spencer, Privacy: The Workplace Issue of the '90s,
23 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 591 (1990).
51. EEOC reports show the number of Title VII sexual harassment claims grew
from 10,532 in 1992 to 15,889 in 1997. See Kimberly MAills, Suiting up After Major
Rulings on Sexual Harassment by the U.S. Supreme Court, There's Little Doubt Where
the Trend is Headed, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 12, 1998, at El.
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
53. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2271 (1998) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
54. See, e.g., Bolden v. PRC, Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 551, n.1 (10th Cir. 1994).
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court would ever rule that our public policy places a greater
value on eliminating sexual harassment than it places on elimi-
nating racial harassment; and surely Justice Souter, who wrote
that Title VII's purpose is to prevent harm, would agree that
the purpose is to prevent harm from all types of harassment
proscribed by Title VII, with no preference for one type over the
other.55 Recently, both the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have ap-
plied Ellerth and Faragher to race discrimination cases, al-
though the Fifth Circuit case did not address the new affirma-
tive defense.56 The Ninth Circuit recently declined to decide
whether to apply these decisions in a Title VII retaliation
case.
57
IV. STUDENTS AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Juxtaposed against the Ellerth and Faragher decisions is
another Supreme Court decision from the 1998 term, Gebser v.
Lago Vista Independent School District,5 which held that un-
der Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,"9 a school
district cannot be held liable for sexual harassment of a student
by a teacher unless a school district official with authority "to
institute corrective measures" had actual notice of the wrongful
conduct and was deliberately indifferent to it.6"
In this case a high school teacher and one of his students
had sexual intercourse a number of times during the student's
sophomore and junior years. The student did not report this to
55. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2292.
56. See Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, 156 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the new liability rules set forth in Ellerth and Faragher rendered the
employer liable for punitive damages); see also Wright-Simmons v. Oklahoma City,
155 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 1998).
57. See Gregory v. Widnall, 153 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1998).
58. 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).
59. Title IX reads in pertinent part as follows: "No person . . . shall, on the basis
of sex, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educa-
tion program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)
(1994). This statute apparently tracks the language of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which prohibits race discrimination in all programs that receive federal
funds. See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1997 (citing Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555,
566 (1984)).
60. See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1999.
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the school district, which learned about the sexual relationship
only after the teacher and student were "caught in the act."6
Earlier, however, the principal of the school had counseled the
offending teacher concerning sexual remarks he had allegedly
made in class and about which some parents had complained.
The principal had not reported any problems about the offend-
ing teacher to the superintendent of the district, who served as
the Title IX compliance officer.62 During this time the district
had no formal anti-harassment policy and no grievance proce-
dure for reporting sexual harassment complaints as required by
Title IX regulations. The student and her parents sued the
teacher and the school district, and the only issue before the
Court was the liability of the school district.63
In a five-to-four decision, the Court rejected the argument
that it should apply the same rules as are applied in Title VII
cases involving supervisor/employee harassment." Justice
O'Connor, writing for the majority, pointed out that Title VII
specifically allows a cause of action for discrimination, while
Title IX's cause of action is implied.65 Following precedent that
"a private remedy should not be implied if it would frustrate
the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme," the majority
found that it would "frustrate the purposes" of Title IX to fol-
low rules of agency or constructive notice in a Title IX sexual
harassment case involving a teacher and student.66 Included in
the majority's reasoning was the fact Title VII, at the time
Title IX was passed, did not allow compensatory damages as a
remedy.67 Additionally, the Court explained that regulations
enforcing Title VII's non-discrimination policies give administra-
tive agencies "the power of the purse," allowing them to with-
draw funds from offending school districts." The majority
61. Id. at 1993.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 1996. In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60,
75 (1992), in recognizing an implied right of action for teacher/student harassment
under Title IX, the Court invoked Title VII precedent in finding that sexual harass-
ment is sex discrimination.
65. See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1991-92.
66. Id. at 1996-97.
67. See id. at 1997.
68. Id. at 1998.
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found that the regulations envisioned no damage remedies but
favored continued funding for educational purposes when the
school district is "unaware of discrimination .. and is willing
to institute prompt corrective measures." 9
In finding that the plaintiff must show that a district official
had actual notice of the offending conduct and was deliberately
indifferent to it, the majority followed Title IX procedure that
must precede administrative withdrawal of funding as punish-
ment for discrimination. That procedure requires notice to an
"appropriate person" and an opportunity to institute corrective
measures.7 ° Even though Title IX regulations require the insti-
tution and publication of grievance procedures, the majority
found that failure to do so was not deliberate indifference.7
This case illustrates that the liability of the employer (here, a
school district) might be narrowing under Title IX since the ma-
jority held that actual notice to someone with authority is re-
quired. At the same time, the liability of an employer under
Title VII is arguably enhanced after the decisions in Ellerth
and Faragher unless the employer takes steps to insure that
the new affirmative defense is available to it. The Supreme
Court has, in effect, scuttled traditional agency rules for Title
IX and retained them, while adding additional duties of preven-
tive and corrective measures for Title VII.
In his dissent in Gebser,72 Justice Stevens makes many ob-
servations, among them the argument that the district should
be liable under traditional agency principles because the offend-
ing teacher "was aided in accomplishing the tort by the exis-
tence of the agency relation."73 He further points out that the
69. Id. at 1999.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 2000.
72. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined
in this dissent. Justice Ginsburg wrote a separate dissent, which Justice Souter and
Breyer joined, in which she favored recognition of an affirmative defense very similar
to the one adopted by the majority of the Court one week later in Ellerth and
Faragher. See id. at 2007 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 2003 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGEN-
CY § 219(2)(d) (1957)).
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teacher "exercised even greater authority and control over his
students than employers and supervisors exercise over their
employees."'74
Perhaps the strongest policy statement in Justice Stevens's
dissent is that school districts will be liable only when their
officials have actual knowledge of the wrongful conduct 7 5 This,
says Justice Stevens, is inconsistent with the statutory incen-
tive to minimize "the danger that vulnerable students will be
exposed to such odious behavior."76 Without expressing any
personal opinion about what the law should be, I anticipate
that critics might say that the rule adopted by the majority
encourages the school district to take the stance of an ostrich
with its head in the sand. The only problem with the analogy is
that the ostrich that has its head in the sand is not placing
itself out of harm's way, while the school district that is delib-
erately ignorant of a teacher's sexual abuse of a student is
doing just that, and can avoid liability.
V. UNCERTAINTIES ON THE EFFECT OF RULES 412 AND 415 OF
THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
As noted, the language of Title VII does not support the
notion that sex discrimination should be singled out for special
legal rules. The same cannot be said of the Federal Rules of
Evidence when wrongful sexual activity is at issue in a case.
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 199477
amended Rule 412 and adopted Rules 413, 414, and 415, all of
which concern evidence of sexual conduct.7 Rule 412, a federal
"rape shield" rule which was extended to civil cases, restricts
evidence of an alleged victim's past sexual behavior. 9 Rule 413
74. Id. at 2004 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. Pub. L. No. 102-322, 108 Stat. 1796.
78. See id.
79. See FED. R. EvID. 412. The rule reads: 'The following evidence is not admissi-
ble in any civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct... (1)
Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior.
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual predisposition." FED. R. EVID.
412(a). However, in civil cases,
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allows evidence of past sexual offenses in criminal sexual as-
sault cases, and Rule 414 applies a similar rule for criminal
cases involving child molestation.0 Both of these rules provide
that the evidence of past offenses "is admissible, and may be
considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is rele-
vant.""l Rule 415 makes Rules 413 and 414 applicable in civil
cases involving sexual assault or child molestation."
The least controversial change is the amendment to Rule
412.83 One area of uncertainty with respect to Rule 412 is the
extent to which it applies in cases in which the plaintiff who
alleges sexual harassment has had consensual sexual relations
with the alleged perpetrator or with others from the workplace.
Clearly the rule prohibits evidence offered to prove the alleged
victim's "sexual predisposition," but the rule contains an excep-
tion if the evidence is "otherwise admissible under these rules
and its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of
harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party."'
Some cases decided before extension of the rule to civil cases
permitted evidence of the victim's prior sexual behavior, when
that behavior was known by the perpetrator, to determine
whether the perpetrator thought his advances were welcomed
by the plaintiff. 5 These cases followed the Supreme Court's
evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or sexual predisposition of
any alleged victim is admissible if it is otherwise admissible under these
rules and its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm
to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party. Evidence of an al-
leged victim's reputation is admissible only if it has been placed in con-
troversy by the alleged victim.
FED. R. EvID. 412(b)(2).
80. See FED. R. EvID. 413, 414.
81. FED. R. EVID 413(a), 414(a).
82. See FED. R. EVID 415. The rule reads, in pertinent part:
In a civil case in which a claim for damages or other relief is predicated
on a party's alleged commission of conduct constituting an offense of
sexual assault or child molestation, evidence of that party's commission of
another offense or offenses of sexual assault or child molestation is ad-
missible and may be considered as provided in Rule 413 and Rule 414 of
these rules.
FED. R. EVID. 415(a).
83. FED. R. EvD. 412.
84. FED. R. EviD. 412(b)(2).
85. See, e.g., Weiss v. Amoco Oil Co., 142 F.R.D. 311, 316 (S.D. Iowa 1992).
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lead in Meritor.6 In Meritor, the plaintiff had prior consensual
sexual relations with her supervisor and the Court noted that
the plaintiffs sexually provocative speech, dress, and testimony
about her personal fantasies were "obviously relevant" to
whether "her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances
were unwelcome.""7 The Court concluded that there was no per
se rule against admitting evidence of a plaintiffs sexual pre-
dilections and that trial courts should weigh the usual consider-
ations in deciding whether to admit such evidence."8
The "usual considerations" to which the Court referred in-
clude the basic tenets set out in Federal Rules of Evidence 404,
404(b), and 403.9 Rule 404 guards against admitting character
evidence to prove conduct in conformity with that character
during a particular occasion."0 However, Rule 404(b) permits
admitting evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" for other
purposes. 1 Finally, Rule 403 requires trial courts to insure
that the probative value of evidence is not substantially out-
weighed by danger of unfair prejudice.2
The legislative history of Rules 413, 414, and 415 reflects
that Congress probably did not intend to strike an imbalance in
the evidence in civil sexual harassment cases, but was instead
more concerned about clarifying evidentiary rules in rape and
child molestation cases.93 Evidently Congresswoman Susan
Molinari and others were determined to hold up President
Clinton's crime bill unless these new evidentiary rules were
adopted.4
86. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
87. Id. at 68-69.
88. See id.
89. Before the advent of Rule 412, two United States District Courts had held
that evidence regarding a plaintiffs sexual history was generally inadmissible charac-
ter evidence and that the discovery of such evidence could not possibly lead to the
admissible evidence. See Mitchell v. Hutchings, 116 F.R.D. 481, 485 (D. Utah 1987);
Priest v. Rotary 98 F.R.D. 755, 758-59 (N.D. Cal 1983).
90. See FED. R. EvID. 404(a).
91. FED. R. Evm. 404(b).
92. See FED. R. EvID. 403.
93. See 140 CONG. REC. H8968-01, H8991-92 (Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Molinari).
94. See James J. Duane, The New Federal Rules of Evidence on Prior Act of Ac-
cused Sex Offenders: A Poorly Drafted Version of a Very Bad Idea, 157 F.R.D. 95, 96
(1994).
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A matter of considerable concern is that the Rules of Evi-
dence have heretofore, been uniformly applicable to all civil
cases in federal court. These rules have withstood the test of
time and have gained a high degree of acceptance. The afore-
mentioned Rules 403 and 404, which are applicable to nearly
all evidence,95 have long been available to judges in determin-
ing the admissibility of past sexual misconduct. Many commen-
tators have been sharply critical of the new Rules 413-415,
which, unlike Rule 412, make no reference to the balancing
analysis of Rule 403."9 Some scholars anticipated that the
courts would find Rules 413, 414, and 415 unconstitutional. 7
This has not happened. Courts instead have been finding that
these rules are to be applied along with Rule 403.98 It is possi-
ble that in some cases, the existence of these rules will not
matter because the courts will continue to do what they have
always done. However, it is clear that at least in the Second
and Tenth Circuits, courts will consider admission of propensity
evidence as probative in the balancing required of the court
under Rule 403.99
Therefore, Rules 412 and 415 have arguably weighed evi-
dence in favor of alleged victims and against alleged perpetra-
tors. This has the potential for increasing employer liability for
sexual harassment by supervisors.' 0 It therefore also has im-
plications regarding screening of job applicants and employer
scrutiny of on-the-job activities of employees. I have seen no
statistics, if any can be produced, concerning whether these
rules have resulted in more sexual harassment lawsuits or
95. Rule 609 is an exception.
96. See James S. Liebman, Proposed Evidence Rules 413 to 415-Some Problems
and Recommendations, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 753 (1995); Duane, supra note 94, at
96.
97. See generally Louis M. Natali, Jr. & R. Stephen Stigall, "Are You Going to
Arraign His Whole Life?": How Sexual Propensity Evidence Violates the Due Process
Clause, 28 LOy. U. CHi. L.J. 1 (1996).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326 (10th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Sumner, 119 F.3d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 1998).
99. See United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1491 (10th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1997).
100. See Cleveland v. KFC National Management Co., 948 F. Supp. 62, 64 (N.D.
Ga. 1996) (applying Rule 415 against an employer to admit, in a Title VII case, past
sexual misconduct of a perpetrator, a former manager who was not a defendant).
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whether they have had any impact upon discovery practices and
settlement negotiations in such suits.''
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the aforesaid uncertainties, one fact is certain: wom-
en have had substantial success in entering the workplace in
so-called "men's jobs." Since the 1960's, substantial numbers of
women have entered many areas of American life that had been
previously reserved for men, either because of our laws or our
culture. Examples of this are the many women who are now in
professions such as law and medicine or who work in other
employment traditionally dominated by men. Our military acad-
emies are now admitting women. In part because of Title IX,
girls are now able to participate in athletics, sometimes on
teams that include boys. All of these advances have placed fe-
males in positions where they are more likely to face sexual
harassment.
The discussion of sexual harassment issues spread from law
schools and courtrooms to become a national debate when the
United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary held hearings
on the nomination of Clarence Thomas to the United States
Supreme Court. Since then, the EEOC has received increased
numbers of complaints alleging sexual harassment. In 1990, the
EEOC received 6,800 such complaints, and in 1997, nearly
16,000.02 The Jones v. Clinton case continues to be the topic
of talk shows and news broadcasts, and the debate will rage
on-and at times it is a very emotional debate--concerning
what constitutes sexual harassment, and whether and how to
remedy it. Employers might even confront more and more law-
suits.
Yet another certainty is that sexual harassment is different
from other types of harassment. Justice Thomas was correct
when he wrote that Title VII does not treat .sex discrimination
101. See generally REPORT OF THE EIGHTH Cmcurr GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE 43-
44 (Sept. 1997) (discussing survey results of attorneys' and judges' opinions concerning
the effects of these rules) [hereinafter EIGHTH CIRCUIT REPORT].
102. See 144 CONG. REC. E1081-03 (daily ed. June 10, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Hamilton).
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differently from other types of discrimination. However, the
potential for misunderstandings between men and women (fre-
quently the subject of pop-psychology books), not to mention the
enormous power of sexual attraction, in fact place sex in its
own category.
There is considerable evidence that men and women simply
do not have the same views concerning what constitutes sexual
harassment."3 The potential for ambiguities is nearly unlim-
ited. For example, if a man calls a woman "honey," he can
either be expressing endearment or condescension. The inten-
tion of the speaker may be different from the listener's inter-
pretation of the speaker's intent.0 4 This type of ambiguity or
misunderstanding is not very likely in a situation of racial ha-
rassment, when, for example, the speaker uses a racial epithet.
I believe the law has realized that sexual harassment is in a
class of its own. Congress, through the adoption of the 1994
amendments to the Rules of Evidence, and the Supreme Court,
in Ellerth and Faragher, have singled out sexual misconduct for
special rules that will have an impact upon employer liability.
But the Court itself has not stated clearly just what Title VII
and Title IX have as their principal purpose when it comes to
sexual harassment. In Faragher, Justice Souter wrote that the
"primary objective" of Title VII "is not to provide redress but to
avoid harm."' 5 But in Gebser, Justice O'Connor reasoned that
the central aim of Title VII is to compensate victims of discrim-
ination.0 6  And, more significantly, the law now extends
considerably more protection to workers who are harassed by
their supervisors than to students harassed by their teachers.
The legislative histories surrounding Title VII and the 1994
amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence establish that
103. See OMILIAN & KAMP, supra note 10, § 22.14.50, at 66-76.
104. A study conducted by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Gender Fairness
Task Force found that women employees "saw their workplace as significantly more
tolerant of sexually harassing behavior than men." EIGHTH CIRcUiT REPORT at 120.
Also, "[m]en were . . . more likely than women to deny, tolerate, or rationalize sexual
harassment." Id. at 118.
105. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2292 (1998) (citing
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)).
106. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1997 ("Thus, whereas Title VII aims centrally to com-
pensate victims of discrimination, Title IX focuses more on 'protecting' individuals
from discriminatory practices carried out by recipients of federal funds.").
[Vol. 33:11
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Congress never imagined that the law of sexual harassment
would be what it is today, much less the effect it might have
upon employer liability. The Supreme Court will continue to
look at employer liability: in this term the Court will decide
cases involving student-to-student harassment, 7 and employ-
er liability for punitive damages under Title VIV'8 Until we
have more guidance, the debate-and the uncertainties-will
continue.
107. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997),
cert. granted, 66 U.S.L.W. 3387 (Sept. 29, 1998) (No. 97-843).
108. See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert.
granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3106 (Nov. 2, 1998) (No. 98-208).
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